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DRAFT (3) 22 July 1952

C I A SUMMARY

set forth in NSC 10/2 and 10/5. This progress, however, has been slow and in most areas severely restricted, partly by the limited nature of available resources and capabilities, but even more by time limitations. It takes a long time to develop the apparatus and the trained personnel and the development of concepts and decline for covert activities of the kind discussed in this report, and fine engaged is Covert activities only a United States has been in the business for ted brief a period, and therefore present developments fall far short of ultimate potential.

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has			mporta e foll		Moslem	world,	some	progress	³ 25X6

- 2. In stimulating an increased awareness among the religious hierarchy of the threat of international Communism;
- 3. In increasing the degree of understanding of the status of Moslems living inside the Soviet orbit; and
- 4. In laying the groundwork for further expanded activities along similar lines. Progress will continue to be slow in this field because of the most delicate and dangerous aspect of Near Eastern affairs from the point of view of foreign intervention.

along these lines. the report emphasizes, however, that this progress has been slow and will continue to be so.

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While, on balance, the U. S. has achieved some psychological gains in the overt field (Treaty of Peace with Japan, Pacific Military Alliances, etc.), the report states bluntly that Soviet power has not been measurably reduced in the Far Eastern areas under its dominance, and that progress toward our objectives

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cares that are of war, CIA regards existing coordinating

certain respects. A coordinating machinery between civilian and military certain respects. A coordinating machanism was set up, for example, but failed to include the operations or usis services in Kerea. Close cooperation with the military exists in the field on intelligence and tactical psychological variare measures. However, a completely effective coordination of two major strategic plans with respect to Korea has not been realized with respect to coordination of command and logistical support, but steps are being taken to remedy this situation.

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Satisfactory progress was also reported in laying the groundwork for future behind-the-lines guerrilla activities.

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LATIN AMERICA

Despite evidence that the Soviet Union is now placing greater emphasis on its covert mechanisms in Latin America, U. S. covert capabilities have substantially increased there, through the expansion of personnel and

facilities

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against the Chinese Communist regime. For the shorter terms, the report

admits only very limited success in the penetration either of Communist

China or the USSR itself.

The CIA report points up the vital importance of VOA as constituting at present the only effective means the U. S. possesses for conducting psychological operations within the confines of the USSE. The report

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Through its covert channels CIA has discovered that VQA broadcasts have been audible in the USSR throughout 1950 and 1951. Although Soviet jamming has considerably reduced the audibility of these broadcasts, nevertheless information obtained from returning German prisoners of war and Soviet refugees and defectors indicates that considerable segments of the Soviet peoples continue to listen to VQA broadcasts despite technical difficulties and personal risk. Some of these refugees have criticised the VQA broadcasts for not being sufficiently forceful and for devoting a considerable portion of the programs to irrelevant matters not bearing directly on the current East-West struggle. Furthermore, ethnic groups such as the Ukranians have complained that the broadcasts are not sufficiently representative of the desires and aspirations of the minority groups within the USSR. But when all this is said, the fact remains that information obtained

by CIA

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by CIA indicates that the VOA broadcasts do play an important role in reminding the peoples of the Soviet Union that there is an alternative way of life and in providing them with hope of ultimate liberation.

Despite a marked increase in the amount of radio propaganda indirectly aimed at encouraging Soviet defectors, the report finds there
was no increase in the number of said defectors over the past year. It
calls for greater emphasis on the psychological utilisation of defectors,
particularly as the core of covert activist cadres would be descrable

In	Western	Europe	especially, th	e report	notes marked	progress	in

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INTERNATIONAL

Major factors that impede the successful prosecution of a national psychological program are listed by the CIA report as including:

a. The continuing inequality in the distribution of income in Western Europe, particularly France, Italy, and Germany, and the very limited success that MSA (and MCA) has

had in

SECURITY INFORMATION

had in bringing pressure to bear to change this situation.

- b. The excessively militaristic and aggressive tone of some of the statements made by our Government officials which play directly into the hands of the Soviet peace offensive.
- c. The inability of the U. S. Government on specific issues relating to colonialism to take a firm and clear stand because of the exigencies of the European alliance system.
- d. The Achilles heel of the racial issue in the United States and the ineffective efforts to date to deal with the exploitation of this situation by the Communists.
- e. The McCarran Act and its limiting prohibitions on immigration into this country.
- f. The fact that our tariff structure runs directly counter to our efforts to expand international trade and severely limits the ability of foreign countries to export to this country.

